Notions of Contingency and Necessity and Signs of Contingency

Source: A Commentary on Theistic Arguments, by: Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli, Translated & Edited by Hassan Allahyari, P. 103-125.

When we observe things, which exist in the external world, including those in the nature, we notice that, by virtue of their essence, existence and nonexistence are not necessary for them. The truth of this claim is attested by their generation (huduth) and corruption (fasad), that is. the fact that at a time, they did not exist, then they found existence; and at a certain time, they will perish. If existence was necessary for them, they would not have been preceded or followed by nonexistence; and by the same token, if nonexistence was necessary for them, they would have never existed.

As explained earlier, an entity for which existence and external reality existent is necessary is called necessary existence (al-wajib al-wujud); and if nonexistence is necessary for it, it is an impossible existence (al-mumtani al- wujud); and if neither existence nor nonexistence is necessary for it, it is a contingent entity (al-mumkin al-wujud).

Though the notions of huduth and corruption are different from the notion of contingency (imkan), these two attributes are found only in contingent entities. However, this is not to say that every contingent (mumkin) is hadith, because it is possible to conceive of a contingent, which does not have temporal huduth and is above temporal changes. For instance, the Divine favor and compassion— as instanced by, “ever-favoring to the creation,” (1) — is eternal and beyond temporal limitations; the incorporeal human soul, that even if hadith, will remain in Paradise or Hell forever; and the Divine Face which according to the verse, “But will remain forever the Face of thy Lord, the Glorious and Gracious,” (2) has eternal Glory and Grace.
Making a note of this point makes it easy to differentiate between the demonstration of contingency and necessity (burhan al-imkan wa wujub) and the demonstration of huduth (burhan al-huduth). The demonstration of contingency and necessity centers on the middle term of contingency (imkan), outlined by the generation and corruption of finite beings; and the demonstration of huduth proceeds from the huduth of various things -
Contingency is also provable without taking huduth and corruption into consideration. When the essence of a particular (juz’i) entity, such as a tree or a human being, is conceived, and none of the two contradictory sides of existence and nonexistence is integral to it, it can be inferred that although in the external world the particular thing is either existent or nonexistent, however, by virtue of its essence, it is without and equidistant to both sides of contradiction. This characteristic—the vacancy of the essence from existence and nonexistence, which is followed by its equidistance to existence and nonexistence —is the source of derivation of the quality of contingency (imkam).
Further contemplation in this regard would illustrate that any external entity the essence (dhat) and essential parts (dhatiyyat) of which are conceivable by the mind and can assume mental existence (al—wujud al-dhehni) is contingent, because if the essence or essential parts of a certain thing can exist by mental existence, given the impossibility of the transfer of external existence (al-wujud al-khariji) to the mind, existence and external reality are not its essence, and are rather outside the boundaries of its essence.

The essence of something to which external reality and existence are necessary and inseparable from cannot transfer to the mind, because real existence projects effects, and mental existence does not produce effects; and a single object, while being the source of many effects, cannot be devoid of producing any effects. Therefore, the mind cannot apprehend the essence and reality of something, which does not come into it; the only thing it can do after its intuitive discernment, is to derive a notion from it and through that notion, which may be at an extreme state of self—evidence, reflect the external reality, which is in extreme occultation. An example is the reality of existence, the essence of which is in extreme disguise from the mind, but the notion of which is self-evident and primary. The Divine sage al-Sabzawari, with regard to the reality of existence, says,

Its notion is among things most se/f evident
While its essence is in extreme concealment (3)

Even if not hadith, and rather eternal and everlasting, something whose quiddity (mahiy’y’a) can transfer to the mind, and the mind can fathom the profundities of its essence, given that it can shift from the external mode of existence (al-wujud al-khariji) to its mental mode while maintaining its essence, has to be separable from external existence. Existence and nonexistence cannot be included in the essence of such a thing, or say, such an essence or quiddity is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, and therefore, contingent.

Argument from Contingents to the Necessary

Something that existence and nonexistence are not parts of its essence, and has equidistance towards the two, cannot become existent or nonexistent by virtue of its essence. That is, if not for an external causal efficacy (al— illiyya al-failliyya), which would necessitate either existence or nonexistence for it and characterize it with one of the two qualities, its essence can be neither existent nor nonexistent. Otherwise, it will mean that while a thing is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, it has existence or nonexistence, and therefore, it is devoid of equidistance towards the two. The concurrence of equidistance and non— equidistance is conj unction of contradictories (ijtema al - naqidhain), which is impossible.
Therefore, in order to exist or not to exist, every contingent entity (mumkin) needs the causal efficacy of an external agency. The agency that necessitates its existence is its existential cause; and the agency that necessitates its nonexistence is the cause of its nonexistence. In the discussions of causation, however, it is proved that the cause of something’s nonexistence is the absence of its existential cause, and not a real and factual entity on its own.
It follows that every contingent needs a being other than itself and until that “other” (ghair) does not remove its need, it does not come into existence. Therefore, wherever there is a contingent in the external world, the other, which has removed its need and has provided it with existence, also exists.
As indicated earlier, this argument can be derived from sermon 186 of nahj al-Balagha, At one section of the sermon it is stated, “Everything, which is known by virtue of its essence, is crafted; and everything, which stands in something other than itself, is caused.” That is, something the essence of which can come into the mind, as explained earlier, cannot have existence as its essence; and therefore, its existence is caused by some agency other than itself.

It should be noted that the “other” upon which the contingent entity is dependent and which satisfies its need cannot be another contingent. Since a contingent entity has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, and something that itself has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, cannot impel another entity that has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence out of the state of equidistance. Rather, in order to depart from the state of equidistance, every equidistant entity needs a non— equidistant entity.
Just as existence and nonexistence are not the essential pans of contingents, and therefore, they have equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, likewise, creation (ijad) and annihilation (in edam) are not inherent in them, and they have equidistance towards the two. Therefore, the creation or annihilation of a contingent cannot be attributed to another contingent. Were this possible, it would mean that a contingent entity, which is equidistant towards creation and annihilation, is not equidistant towards them, which is an obvious conjunction of contradictories.
In order to enter the domain of existence, contingents require the causal efficacy of an external agency, or say, an, “other,” which causes their existence; and the other, which causes their existence, cannot be a contingent phenomenon.
With regard to the negation of causality of a contingent with respect to another contingent, Abd al-Razzaq al-Lahiji, the author of Shawariq al-Ilham, narrates these two principles from Nasir al-Din al-Tusi: “A thing is not existent until it exists. And until it is existent, it cannot create.” That is, since the contingent is devoid of existence, it is not existent. And since it is not existent, it cannot bestow existence either.
A contingent can only create when it depends on an external “other,” which cannot be a contingent. Therefore, existence and creation of a contingent is only conceivable when it is established by and dependent upon “another”, which does not have an equal relation towards existence and nonexistence, and in other words, for which existence is necessary.
The articulation of the demonstration (burhan) in this fashion, without any reliance on impossibility of circular or regressive causality, first, proves the Necessary, and then proves the finitude of the series of contingent entities that are mediates (wasa it) in the act of creation. And if, as is the case, in some of its versions, the argument proceeds from invalidation of circularity (daur) and regress (tasalsul), it is not because these two are critical in the cogency of the demonstration. Rather, it is meant to facilitate the comprehension and indoctrination of the demonstration. Therefore, even if circularity (daur) and regress (tasalsul) were not considered void, the demonstration of contingency and necessity would stilt maintain its tenability.
The need of contingents for the “other” is in the form of a universal affirmative proposition (al—qadhiyya al— mujiba a/-kulliyya). It does not pertain to the totality of the world, so the fact that totality exists only in the mind could undermine its cogency. Rather, it pertains to every entity that has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence. Given the universality of this need, the existence of these entities, which by virtue of their essences are equidistant to existence and nonexistence, cannot be explained on the score of a specific contingent, since every contingent that may be used in the answer is already included in the universal affirmative proposition. If the existence of a particular contingent entity were to be explained, it would be imaginable to suggest another contingent thing as the reason of its existence. Nevertheless, since the question pertains to the entirety of contingent entities, it is only answerable with an entity that is not included in the aggregate, that is, an entity to which the quality of contingency does not apply and existence for which is necessary.

Instrumentality of the Mediates and the Efficacy of the Necessary


Quidditative contingency (al—imkan al—mahuwi), which is the middle term of the demonstration of contingency and necessity, is a necessary and inseparable property of the quiddity (mahiyya). That is, equidistance towards existence and nonexistence is an essential property (al – ‘aradh al-dhati) of quiddity, so much so that even when due to an external causal efficacy it finds existence and is rearranged from the position of equidistance, its essence remains devoid of existence and nonexistence and continues to be characterized by contingency. This is because even after creation (ijad), existence does not become the essence (dhat) or an essential part (juz’ al—dhat) of the quiddity; and therefore, its need for external causal efficacy continues. Al—Shabistari, in Culshan Raz says in this regard:
Cod, the Exalted, is Witness to the truth of my words
Disgrace leaves not the contingent in the two worlds (4)

If a quiddity which comes into existence through the creation of an external agency should be an instrument (ala) for the existence of another quiddity, this mediation (wasata) in creation cannot pertain to its contingent essence. It is brought by that agency, which is needless and independent in His existence and creation. From this vantage point, it is clear that the instrumentality (sababiyya) and mediation (wasata) of contingents in relation to one another is not such that would place God, the Free-of-Need Origin, at the top of the causal series and the contingent intermediates one after the other in a successive manner. Thus, no contingent is a mediate in the transfer of grace (fâidh) by virtue of its essence; and given that they are sustained by the Necessary (al- Wajib) and recipient of His grace, the Origin is present within the context of their instrumentality and mediation.
The mediation of instruments in the transfer of Divine grace is not like the mediation of pipes in transfer of water. A. tap takes water from pipelines that are instruments between the tap and the reservoir. No contingent in the series of contingents possesses the existence that has to be transferred to the next contingent; rather, the Divine grace is present within the series and nearer to each one of its units than any other unit. “Nowhere taketh place any secret counsel between three [persons] but He is the fourth of them, nor between five, but He is the sixth, nor [between] less than that, nor [between] more but He is with them wherever they may be.” (5)
If efficacy and creation of the Being, which is free of need and dependence, that is, the Necessary Existent (al— Wajib al-wujud), were limited to the creation of the first contingent entity—which would, in turn, create the second contingent, which would, in turn, create the third, and so on—and the series of contingents existed in a successive fashion without any temporal distance between its units, it would suggest that the Necessary grants existence and creation to the essence of the contingent. It would further follow that the contingent, by receiving the grace (fàidh), loses its state of equidistance and essential contingency. Moreover, it would imply that the Free-of-Need Origin is at the top of the series and is one of its many units; and His grace is the source of the grace, which descends from the first contingent to the second and then to other creatures. This would translate to the view that His essence and grace are limited to the top of the successive series. Nonetheless, both corollaries are corrrupt, since quidditative contingency (al—imkan al—mahuwi), as explained earlier, contrary to potentiality (al-iste’dad), is an attribute that does not separate from the contingent. Additionally, infinitude of the Necessary and boundlessness of His grace, which are proved in the discussions of His attributes, do not reconcile with Him being confined to the first member of the putative series.
To call the instrumentality (sababiyva) and mediation (wasata) of instruments (asbab) and mediates (wasa‘it) between the first efficient cause and its effect causality is for the sake of facilitating teaching and learning. In fact, these mediates resemble mirrors that merely exhibit the emanation of Divine grace and His exclusive rule, and by virtue of their essences, none of them have any role in creation; and thus, no mediate is a true efficient cause. In other words, ascription of causal efficacy to mediates—similar to ascription of existence to contingents—is in view of the association of Divine grace with them, and more accurately, in view of the manifestation of Divine grace in them. Therefore, such ascription is figurative.

Huduth of the Mediates and Eternity of the Divine Grace

The demonstration of contingency and necessity (buran al-imkan wa al-wujub) illustrates that the need and dependence of an effect on its cause owes to its contingency (imkan). And since contingency is inseparable from the contingent quiddity, as long as a contingent is graced with existence, its intense dependence and need to its existential cause continues. For this reason, the efficient cause has presence and authority over all conditions of its effect, and the effect’s need is not limited to a specific condition, such as the moment of its huduth.

The Sustentative Authority (al-ihata al-qayumiyya) of the efficient cause over its effect negates the existence of a horizontal relationship between the two. Causal efficacy is not perceivable between entities that come into being one after another in the course of time in a successive series, because during the entire period of its existence, the effect is needful to its existential cause. However, the temporally successive entities follow one another, and the existence of the following entity coincides with the nonexistence of the preceding entity. How can something that exists now be the effect of an efficient cause that does not exist any more?

The causality, which the non-philosophic minds assign to temporally successive series, is not, in fact, something to which the effect owes its existence. In philosophical parlance, things that come into existence and events that happen in a temporal sequence —such as parents who are conditions of the inception of their and their children’s children—are considered conditions and supplementary causes (al-’ ilal al-mu’ idda); and the efficient cause of every entity is the Necessary Being Who is with the effect all its life long. “And He is with you wherever yon be.” (6)

It can be inferred from this discussion that the supplementary causality (al- ‘illiyya al-e’edadiyya) of things, which are horizontal to contingents, unlike the causality of something that may be vertical to them, is not by virtue of their essence. Rather, it pertains to that very infinite and expansive Divine grace and “One Command’’ (7) which has manifested in the image of mediates and conditions. The Majestic Qur’an, in view of this reality, denies the causality and mediation of conditions and instruments such as parents and farmers in the generation of children and crops, and reserves this role for the Almighty Allah: “Have ye seen what ye emit [the life germ]? Is it ye that create or are We the Creators? Have ye seen what ye sow? What! Is it ye that grow it or are We the Growers?” (8)
After proving the Necessary through the demonstration of contingency and necessity (buran al—imkan wa al—wujub), the finitude of the vertical succession of instruments and conditions can be established. Al-Farabi has argued for the finitude of vertical causes on the same grounds. (9) However, the finitude of conditions and supplementary causes that are horizontal to each other cannot be justified on the same account. For this reason, the infinite succession of dependent entities along the course of eons is compatible with the demonstration of contingency and necessity. Because if there is an infinite succession of dependent entities, not only it cannot suggest finitude for the Divine grace, rather it will indicate the boundlessness and eternity of Cod’s grace. “And every favor of Yours is eternal.” (10)

Such eternity-, like the everlasting life of the Paradise—dwellers, does not pertain to the essence of contingents. It owes to the Divine grace and benevolence and its attribution to the world and creatures is figurative (majazi). Because if eternity is ascribed to the essence of the contingent entities, contingency—which is an essential property (al- 'aradh al-dhati) of quiddity—gives place to necessity. This follows that an essential property (al- 'aradh al-dhati), that is, contingency, is not an essential property, which is a conjunction of contradictories.

This argument would have indicated the impossibility of the eternity of the world, if the Divine grace were solely availed to a single contingent entity. However, in the infinite series of supplementary causes (al-’ ilal al-mu’ idda), such an entity does not exist, as in the successive series, every entity is subject to change and mutability and every unit generates and corrupts. As far as the putative series or whole is concerned, it is a mental concept which, as a result of perception of multiplicities, is brought about in the mind and does not have any external reality over and above the units of the series. Therefore, in the course of temporally successive hadiths, an entity the eternity of which alone may reflect the infinite grace does not exist. For this reason, the Divine grace and favor is eternal, but their recipients, by virtue of their essences, are in absolute nihility and nonexistence; and it is by Divine grace that the natural world, which is the world of change and flux, generates and corrupts at every moment. With regard to this, says al- Sabzawari, at his Al-Mandhuma,

His Benevolence is eternal and perpetual
While the recipient is ever-perishing and nihil (11)

Criticism s and Evaluations

The demonstration of contingency and necessity revolves around the essential contingency of quiddities. The main characteristic of this demonstration is the fact that it does not depend on a specific phenomenon such as motion, design, huduth. and so forth. Its focal point is the relation of essence of entities with existence and being real.
This demonstration has entered western philosophical thought in the Middle Ages through the works of Ibn Rushd (Averroës) and the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas. Later in the modern western philosophy, it became subject to scrutiny and criticism. In addition to its western critiques, the demonstration of contingency and necessity has also been evaluated by Islamic philosophers.
The criticisms of the demonstration of contingency and necessity in Islamic philosophy apply to some of its versions, not to the exposition we presented. In some versions of the demonstration, the impossibility of circular and regressive causation has not been relied upon and the series of contingent entities has been considered as a totality. Such versions have been subject to criticism that the series is a mental concept, and in the external world, does not it have a reality over and above its units; in other words, the external world, an entity such as the series or aggregate, the contingency of which would lead to its existential cause, does not exist.
Some versions of the demonstration rely upon the impossibility of circular and regressive causation. This has encouraged the proponents of the possibility of causal regress (al—tasalsul al—’illi) to criticize the demonstration. However, first, the impossibility of regressive causation is not deniable, because although not every causal series is impossible, a series that is characterized by the three qualities of infinity, causal relationship between its members, and coexistence of its members at the same time, is impossible for the reasons given at its appropriate place. Second, the demonstration’s cogency does not really depend on the impossibility of circular or regressive causation, and its usage has a mere educational purpose.
As on the one hand criticisms of the demonstration of contingency and necessity in contemporary western philosophy indicate their lack of understanding of the argument, on the other, it stands for the defective and faulty translations of intimations that are grounds of common consensus amongst the luminaries of Divine wisdom.
In some translations, other arguments, such as the demonstrations (barahin) of motion and huduth have been mentioned under the title of demonstration of contingency and necessity; and then criticisms, which may apply to them, have been presumed to be valid with respect to the demonstration of contingency and necessity. At other instances, the demonstration of contingency and necessity has been differentiated from another argument, which has been named ‘the argument of causality’. While causation (’illijyya) is a common principle that is used in every argument, including the demonstration of contingency and necessity, and it does not constitute an independent argument horizontal to the demonstration of contingency and necessity and other arguments.
In addition to the fact that the tenability of most theistic arguments, such as the demonstrations of huduth, motion, design, and so forth, presupposes the validity of the principle of causation, should the very principle of causation be disputed. the necessary relationship between an argument’s premises and the conclusion thereof will be subject to doubt. This would jar the path of reason and rationality on the one hand, and make critique irrelevant as well. This is because every argument is based on the causal rapport between its premises and the conclusion thereof, and every criticism must have a demonstrative form. If the principle of causation is not accepted, there will be no way, as explained fully before, to prove or negate anything.
In order to prevent confusion between the demonstrations of Divine Essence and those of His attributes and disallow the expectations of proving Divine attributes from the arguments of His essence, it is important to differentiate between the notion of Divine Essence and notions, which reflect His attributes. Moreover, in order to critique or defend an argument in its own context and ensure that different arguments are not confused with one another, the content of every argument’s premises must be preserved.
The middle terms of the demonstrations of huduth, motion, and contingency and necessity are different from one another; and, as it will come, their conclusions are not identical either. The tenability of the demonstrations of huduth and motion is indebted to the demonstration of contingency and necessity, so much so that without this adduction they fail to prove the Necessary.

Evaluation of Hume‘s Criticism

The version of the demonstration of contingency and necessity, which has come in this work, illustrates the corruption and invalidity of the criticism advanced by some a western theologian and philosophizer. The criticism asserts that if the world’ s parts are equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, and therefore are characterized by contingency and need to an external causality, the same does not necessarily have to be true about their ensemble, since there is no evidence to suggest that the parts and the ensemble are governed by the same rules. For instance, it cannot be generalized from the fact that every human being has a mother that the entire human race has also a mother.

The critic has presumed that the argument is based on quidditative contingency of the totality of world’s parts, whereas the demonstration (burhan) proceeds from the premise that without the efficacy of an external agency, a contingent entity cannot come into existence. This proposition speaks of all contingent beings, not their whole, because the whole does not even exist. And since it does not exist, it is neither necessary nor contingent, and therefore, it does not have a need of another. This lack of need is a negative proposition the subject of which does not exist, what we call a negative proposition by the nonexistence of its subject (al –saliba bi intifa’ al-maudhu’) Obviously, although the ensemble of the contingent entities, which is a mental concept, does not exist in the external world, it does have a mental existence under the auspices of the existence of knowledge. In this shadowy existence (a/-wujud al-dhilli), the title of aggregate is predicated to it by predication as essence (al-haml al-awwali a/-dhati), not by predication as extension (al-haml al-sha‘e al-sinai).Therefore, on its own right, being contingent entity, it is a member of the series of contingent entities and an extension for the mentioned proposition. As explained during the exposition of the demonstration (burhan), every contingent the quiddity of which is entertained, since the said proposition is applicable to it, it is characterized by need and dependence and can be realized only through the causal efficacy of a reality, which is not characterized by this quality and is, by virtue of its essence, needless and independent.

Even if the aggregate of contingents were not a mere mental existence and were real and external, the said proposition will still be applicable to it. This further strengthens the demonstration (burhan), since in this case, the aggregate of the world is a real and a non—reified quiddity, the existence or nonexistence of which is conceivable without any contradiction, and therefore, is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence. It follows that the preponderance of either existence or nonexistence over the other requires a preponderant that will justify the preponderance.
This illustrates that the criticism, which is related from Hume, is not applicable to the demonstration of contingency and necessity. Hume contends that we have never experimented the totality of the world so the claim of its need to an external causal efficacy could be justifiable. This criticism can be considered valid only if the argument were based on the contingency of the aggregate of the contingent entities; whereas first, the aggregate lacks external existence; and second, the aggregate of the contingent entities has not been used in this demonstration (burhan) as a premise; and third, even if the aggregate existed and were used in the argument, contingency and need would be its essential properties, and apprehension of these properties does not require experiment.

The Denial of Philosophic Meaning of Necessity and its Answer

Another criticism directed at the demonstration of contingency and necessity asserts that necessity is a logical category, and an existential proposition cannot be narrated with logical necessity. It claims that if existence was necessary for God, the proposition “God is nonexistent” would be self—contradictory, and “God exists” will be logically necessary and true, whereas we can doubt Cod’s existence.
In other words, necessity is a logical concept that describes the modality of tautological propositions, and it cannot be used to reflect external existence of things. There is nothing, Hume argues, the existence of which is demonstrable and whatever we conceive of as existent, we can conceive of as nonexistent. For instance, we can conceive, without any contradiction, of Cod’s nonexistence even if this may imply the nonexistence of the world. Whereas, if existence had logical necessity for Cod, the conception of His nonexistence would certainly entail contradiction.
In order to answer this criticism, it has to be established that necessity has a common meaning in logic and philosophy. Necessity is used in philosophy with the same meaning that describes modality of propositions in logic. Furthermore, necessity is an axiomatic concept, which philosophy first proves its existence, and then logic presupposes its truth as a lemma borrowed from philosophical discussions, and explains its various types.
It was elucidated earlier that necessity, possibility, and impossibility are axiomatic concepts and do not have real definitions. However, because philosophy is the study of existence, the division of existent things into necessary, contingent, and impossible is a philosophical inquiry. Appraisal of things in relation to existence in the form of two exclusive disjunctive propositions (al—munfasila al— haqiqiyya) results in the division of things into necessary, contingent, and impossible; and the same appraisal in the form of one exclusive disjunctive proposition results in the dichotomy of things into necessary and contingent entities.
These entire divisions center on the principle of non-contradiction; that is, the impossibility of conjunction and negation of contradictories (istehala ijtema’ wa irtefa’ al —naqidhain). Since either existence is necessary for a thing, or it is not; if it is not, then either nonexistence is necessary for it or it is not. On the other hand, either existence is necessary for an existent thing, or it is not. However, if existence is not necessary for it, nonexistence cannot be necessary for it, as it exists. Therefore, if an existent entity- is not necessary, since it cannot have necessity of nonexistence, it is a contingent entity.
After philosophy depicts these divisions in a demonstrative format and narrates the external existence of the last two kinds, logic, in the province of its inquiry— which is the mental concepts—identifies their extensions (masadiq) and puts forth thirteen kinds of necessary propositions.
Some mutakellimun, such as al-Qadhi Adhud al-Iji in his Al-Mawaqif, have presumed that there is a difference between philosophical and logical necessity. (12) Al-Iji holds that if necessity had an identical meaning in philosophy as well as in logic, then in instances where essential parts (dhatiyyat) or essential properties (lawazaim al-dhat or al-awaridh al-dhatiyya) of a thing are predicated to it, it would mean that the thing is a necessary being. For example, the proposition “Four is necessarily even” would indicate that four has necessity of existence.
Sadr al—Din al—Shirazri, in the discussions of modality of the noble book of Al—Asfar, has rejected al-Iji’s presumption as false and has made it clear that necessity has one meaning: however, in every case it corresponds to its predicate and subject.(13) If it is stated that, for instance, four is necessarily- even, it does not imply that four is necessarily existent. Rather it means that four is necessarily even. Therefore, what has been implied is tenable, and what is untenable has not been implied.
Logic’s (al—mantiq) dependence on philosophy in the subject of necessity resembles its dependence on philosophy in the subject of predication (haml). In the discussions of unity (wahda) and multiplicity (kathra),
existence is divided into one and multiple. Then unity and multiplicity are divided into various kinds. Among the types of unity (wahda), there is individual unity (al-wahda al—shakhsiyya), specie unity (al—wahda al—nau’iyya), genus unity (al-wahda al-jinsiyva), sheer unity (al-wahda al—mahadha), and the unity that encompasses multiplicity. This last kind of unity is called “it-is-itness” (hu-huwiyya). “It-is-itness” is predication, which is either as essence (al-haml al—awwali) or as extension (al—haml al—sha’ye). Logic takes predication as granted and formulates its discussions on its basis; nonetheless, the affirmation of predication itself is not a logical inquiry.
Not only in many of its discussions, but also in the subject of its study, that is, acquired knowledge or concepts and judgments, logic is indebted to philosophy, because the existence of knowledge as well as its division into acquired and intuitive the division of acquired knowledge into concepts and judgments are philosophical inquiries. The fact that some of these phenomena are primary or self— evident does not eclipse their philosophical identity, since the criterion for including a proposition in a discipline is the analysis of its subject; if its subject is existence, and the predicate is assigned to it qua existence, then the proposition pertains to philosophy.
In short, necessity is a self—evident concept, and the study of its reality is a philosophic inquiry. Logic uses this secondary philosophical intelligible (al-ma’qul al-thani al—falsafi) in the context of predications and copulas of propositions that are secondary logical intelligibles (al-ma’qul al-thani al—mantiqi).
Although necessity has a single meaning, as indicated earlier, it has different rules in different instances. The said criticism originates from the assumption that first, necessity has a mere logical meaning and does not have a philosophical usage that would describe external things and realities, and second, logical necessity is restricted to analytical propositions where the predicate is included in the essence of the subject. The critic has presumed that necessity exists only when a subject is predicated to itself or to its essential parts, such as ‘‘Human is human” or ‘‘Human is an animal).”

According to this presumption, necessity is inevitably restricted to mental concepts and it cannot reflect the external reality of things. The reply to this presumption is that necessity is not exclusive to analytical and tautological propositions and it can be literally used in the predication of essential properties (al-a’radh al-a’dhatiyya) of a thing, a category the scope of which is wider than essential parts.
The essential parts (al-a’dhatiyyat) of an essence are things that are included in its definition (hadd), and their predication is considered tautology or identity-claim- On the other hand, essential properties of things—for instance, contingency (imkan) with respect to finite entities—are concepts that are not included in their definitions.
Contingency is a concept, which is not an essential part of finite entities. It is abstracted and predicated to them only after they are assessed with existence and nonexistence. In the light of this, it becomes clear that need and dependence on the external causal efficacy are not concepts that are the essence or essential parts of contingents, and therefore, they are their essential properties.
The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not depend on the rational analysis of conceived notions and quiddities; rather, it is based on the rational analysis of realities that exist in the external world. It proceeds from the assessment of the essences of existent things with relation to existence and nonexistence. In this demonstration, even the notion of existence qua notion of existence is not used, and rather, the notion of existence qua its external reality is examined.
The arguments that are dedicated to the analysis of Divine attributes elucidate that the Necessary does not have a quiddity in addition to His reality and existence; in other words, His quiddity is His external factuality (al-Wajib mahiyyatuhu inniyyatuh). Similarly, His necessity does not have an extension separate from His reality and is nothing but the severity and extremity of His existence. Therefore, the usage of necessity in relation to Cod does not reflect the modality of predication; it reflects severity, emphasis, and extremity of a phenomenon that has no reality but factuality.

Since the critic considers necessity as a mere logical concept, the usage of which is exclusive to tautological propositions, he presumes that should Cod have necessity of existence, then external existence must be an essential part of His concept, and its negation, like any other proposition that takes away the essence or essential part of a subject, would be self—contradictory.

Externa1 existence is not included in the notion of the Necessary. The necessity, which is involved in the notion of the Necessary, is not a necessity, which describes the modality of propositions; it is a necessity, which is sheer external existence and factuality.(14) The notion of the necessary being, which reflects this sort of necessity, on its own right, is devoid of such necessity, since although, by predication as essence it is the Necessary; by predication as extension, it is a mental phenomenon, which exists in the sphere of human know1edge, and is a contingent and perishable.

The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not proceed from the premise that existence is an essential part of the notion of the Necessary Being. Since if it were the case, comprehension of this notion would be simultaneous to discernment of God’s existence and negation of His existence would be self—contradictory, and there would not be any need to prove His existence.

Evaluation of the Epistemological Criticism

Another criticism raised against the demonstration of contingency and necessity stems from certain epistemological perspectives. It states that the demonstration would be tenable if it were the case that the external reality was rationally discernable, and additionally, rational discernments were representative of external reality. Nonetheless, if reality is a brute phenomenon with a complete irrational identity, the argument is not conclusive.

For instance, the demonstration relies on an exclusive disjunctive proposition, which divides existent things into necessary and contingent things. This disjunctive proposition is contingent upon the principle of non-contradiction, which relates the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories. However, the conjunction of contradictories is a rational judgment about the external world; should the external world have a brute and irrational identity, the applicability of this judgment to the external world, and consequently, the validity of the conclusion of the demonstration will be subject to doubt.
The answer to this criticism becomes clear by what was elucidated with regard to epistemic worth of knowledge. The critic in this criticism has made the entirety of human knowledge subject to criticism. This distrust, which proclaims skepticism (shakkakiyya) and devaluates knowledge, entails nothing but sophism and negation of reality.
Although this and other similar skeptical and sophist perspectives dominate the contemporary western thought, it cannot so much as justify or explain itself. Like the basic reality, knowledge is a primary phenomenon, such that there is no way to deny or express skepticism with regard to it. Though every kind of doubt and skepticism about knowledge is, by predication as essence, doubt and skepticism about it, by predication as extension, it is the undeniable acknowledgement of the reality of knowledge; and therefore, the basic reality of knowledge cannot be denied or doubted in any situation.

1 -A1-Qummi, Shaykh Abbas . mafatih al-jinan. Friday Eve Supplications.2-55: 27
3 - Al-Sabzawari, Haj Mulla Hadi. Sharh aI-Mandhuma. (Qum:Maktabat al—Mustafawi, the section on Hikmah, 9.
4 - Shabistari, Shaykh Mahmud. Culshan Raz. (Tehran: Mahmudi Books, 1981), 7.
5- 58:7
6- 57: 4
7- Derived from the holy verse, “Our command is but one.” 54:50
8 - 56: 58—63
9- Al-Fârâbi, Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad. Zainun al- Kabir. (Hyderabad Dakhan: The Uthmani Encyclopedia Council Press, 1926), 4.
10- A1-Qummi, Shaykh Abbas . mafatih al-jinan. The Supplications for the Dawns of the Holy Month of Ramadhan.
11 - Al-Sabzawari, Haj Mulla Hadi. Sharh aI-Mandhuma. (Qum:Maktabat al—Mustafawi, the section on Hikmah, 322.
12- Al-Jurjani, al-syed al-Sharif Ali ibn Muhammad. Sharh al-Mawaqif.(Qum: Sharif Radhi Publications. 1929), Vol. 3, 121.
13- Al—Shirazri, Muhammad. ibn Ibrahim Sadr al—Din. AlHikma al Muta’aliya fi al-Asfar al-Arba’a. (Tehran: Dâr al-Ma’arif al-Islamiya, 1959), Vol. 1, 91.
14- Since the author acknowledges that necessity- has only one meaning, and it is used in philosophy and logic with that same meaning, and it is well established that the logical usage or necessity is exclusive to the description of modality of propositions, it seems that the criticism ought to be answered in the following way: It is acknowledged that necessity can only describe the modality of predication, however, the notion of the necessary being comprises, in fact, a proposition, the modality of which is described by necessity. ‘The necessary being, therefore, stands for ‘‘that thing, which necessarily exists.’’
However, it is obvious that this predication is predication as essence, not predication as extension; and when the critic says that he can conceive Cod’s nonexistence without any sort of contradiction, and therefore existence cannot be necessary for Him, he means that he can conceive God’s nonexistence by predication as extension, not by predication as essence. Therefore, he cannot conclude that since God’s nonexistence, by predication as extension, is conceivable without any sort of contradiction, existence cannot be necessary for Him by predication as essence. This is because the existence of something, which by predication as essence is necessarily existent, cannot be denied by predication as essence except through self—contradiction; and if such a thing’s existence is denied by predication as extension, it does not undermine the conceptual and propositional premises of the demonstration.*